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Administration and Judicial Review
of Economic Controls
In connection with the initiation of Phase II of the Nixon Adminis-
tration's wage and price control program, the President proposed to
Congress in October, 1971, that it extend and amend the statutory au-
thority for the controls, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.1 The
amendments to the Act, approved by Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent on December 22, elaborate the standards to which control regula-
tions and decisions must conform and create a specialized system for
judicial review of stabilization measures. 2 In addition, the amendments
direct the control agencies to establish by regulation appropriate proce-
dures, including agency review, "available to any person for the pur-
pose of seeking an interpretation, modification, or rescission of, or seek-
ing an exception or exemption from... rules, regulations, and orders." 3
On January 21, the Cost of Living Council, the Pay Board, the Price
Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to this statu-
1 84 Stat. 799 (1970), as amended, 84 Stat. 1468 (1970), 85 Stat. 13 (1971), 85 Stat. 38
(1971). The Act authorized the President to "issue such orders as he may deem appropriate
to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on
May 25, 1970" and to make "such adjustments as may be necessary to prevent gross
inequities." 84 Stat. 799 (1970). This authority was, under the original Act, to expire on
February 28, 1971, but was extended by Pub. L. 92-15, § 3 (May 18, 1971) to April 30,
1972. 85 Stat. 38 (1971). On August 15, 1971, invoking this statutory authority, the Presi-
dent imposed a ninety-day freeze on prices, rents, wages, and salaries in order to place an
immediate brake on the rate of inflation and to provide an interim period in which to
devise more flexible mechanisms for securing economic stability. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36
Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11617, 36 Fed. Reg. 17813 (1971). On
October 15, the general structure of the postfreeze control program, Phase II, was estab-
lished. The Pay Board and the Price Commission were created to prescribe regulations
and standards and to make rulings and decisions governing wage and price increases in
accordance with general policies formulated by the Cost of Living Council. Exec. Order
No. 11627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20139 (1971), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11630, 36 Fed. Reg.
21023 (1971). The Internal Revenue Service was subsequently delegated responsibility to
administer the service and compliance functions under the controls. Cost of Living Council
Order No. 5, 36 Fed. Reg. 21798 (1971). The ninety-day freeze was terminated on November
13, and the control program formulated by the Phase H agencies went into effect. For the
full text of a White House background paper describing the structure and purposes of the
postfreeze stabilization program, see US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, No. 8, at 2226 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as White House Background Paper].
2 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, 85 Stat. 743 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as 1971 Amendments].
3 1971 Amendments § 207(b).
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tory command, issued comprehensive regulations to govern the pro-
cedural structure of the control system. 4
Both Congress, in its amendments to the Act, and the control agen-
cies, in their regulations, may have been responding,5 in part at least, to
the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia in Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, in which a three-judge panel held
that the Act was not, on its face, an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to the President. The plaintiff union contended that the
Act, lacking any indication whatever of the standards and procedures
by which the stabilization program was to operate, gave the President a
" 'blank check' for internal affairs which is intolerable in our constitu-
tional system." 7 The court responded that the Act could not be given
the "extremist" interpretation proposed by the union because, first, the
Act implied a duty to take whatever action necessary to insure general
fairness and broad equity in light of what is feasible in a general control
program;8 second, control activities would be limited by administrative
standards developed as the program progressed, against which particular
actions could be tested; 9 third, there was a presumption of judicial re-
view of stabilization measures;' 0 and, finally, the stabilization agencies
would be subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act." While the court declined to declare the Act an unconstitutional
delegation, it placed the federal government on notice that in the course
of administering the Act, there must be established procedural safe-
guards and standards appropriate to the nature and activities of the
program and commensurate with the interests that it affects. 2 This com-
ment will examine the procedural regulations promulgated by the con-
trol agencies, as well as the administrative and judicial review provisions
of the 1971 amendments, in light of the requirements of due process.
The central inquiry of this study will be whether, because of the wide-
4 Cost of Living Council Procedural Regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§ 105 et seq. (1972); Pay
Board Procedural Regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§ 205 et seq. (1972); Price Commission Procedural
Regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§ 305 et seq. (1972); Internal Revenue Service Procedural Rules
Relating to Economic Stabilization, 6 C.F.R. §§ 401 et seq. (1972).
5 See S. RE'. No. 92-507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
6 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J.).
7 Id. at 754.
8 Id. at 755-58.
9 Id. at 758-59.
10 Id. at 759-61.
11 Id. at 761-62.
12 Amalgamated Meat Cutters is an example of an incipient trend in the case law to-
ward viewing the problems against which the otherwise effectively moribund nondelega-
tion doctrine is directed as questions of due process and administrative fairness rather than
simply of separation of powers. See K.C. DAvis, ADnmmirRTivE LAw TEXT § 2.09 (3d ed.
1972).
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scale application of the present controls and because of the felt need for
speed, uniformity, and efficiency in their operation, there is funda-
mental tension between comprehensive economic controls, on the one
hand, and normal standards of procedural fairness, on the other.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTROLS
The experience of the federal government during both World War II
and the Korean conflict with direct control of wages and prices figured
prominently in congressional consideration of both the original Act
and the 1971 amendments. 13 The amendments that the Administration
first proposed were in some respects modeled after the statutory pro-
visions that governed the wartime control authorities. 14 The Adminis-
tration apparently contemplated foreshortened administrative and
judicial review procedures similar in some ways to those employed in
the prior control periods' 5-- procedures that had been upheld by the
Supreme Court against arguments that they violated procedural due
process. 16
It is questionable, however, that the administrative and judicial
review provisions of the wartime control programs can provide models
against which the adequacy of the provisions of the present program
can be measured or that the decisions holding the wartime provisions
constitutional indicate that similarly summary procedures can con-
stitutionally be employed in the present system of comprehensive con-
trols. In the Amalgamated Meat Cutters decision, the court stated that
the "context of the 1970 stabilization statute includes the stabilization
statutes passed in 1942, and the stabilization provisions in Title IV of
the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the 'common lore' of anti-
inflationary controls established by the agency approaches and court
18 Concerning the original Act, see H.R. REP. No. 91-1380, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
Hearings on H.R. 17880 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 26795-843 (1971) (House debate). Concerning the 1971 amend-
ments, see, for example, 117 CONG. R1c. S19940-95 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1971) (particularly
Remarks of Senator Proxmire).
14 The Administration's amendments were submitted to Congress on October 19, 1971
and introduced as companion bills. S. 2712, H.R. 11309, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
1 See text and notes at notes 60-61, 90 infra. The White House Fact Sheet on the 1971
amendments noted, for example, that section 207 of the Senate bill would provide that
"any agency administering the Stabilization Program will be exempt from the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), except for the public information section. The ordinary pro-
cedure of the APA would involve delay and a great deal of manpower. Phase II agencies
will be allowed to develop streamlined procedures." CCH ECONOMIC CoNTRoLs, No. 27, at
3 (Oct. 21, 1971).
16 Text and notes at notes 30-34 infra.
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decisions."'71 While this context may help indicate, in a rough way
at least, some of the legal and constitutional parameters within which
detailed, universal regulation of prices and wages must operate, the
degree to which prior experience with controls can provide guidance in
resolving the legal questions that may arise under the present controls
is limited by the differences between the substantive policies of past
control schemes and those of the program now in operation.18
The present control program, like the wartime control programs
before it, is intended to mitigate the dangers that inflation presents to
the economy and society.19 But those responsible for initiating and
administering the present controls perceive the economic problems that
have caused the current inflation as essentially different from those
problems with which the wartime control agencies had to deal. What-
ever the correctness of these differing perceptions of inflation, they have
led to differences between the substantive characteristics and procedural
requirements of the present stabilization scheme and those of the World
War II and Korean conflict programs.
A. Characteristics of the Wartime Controls
The prevalent diagnosis of the causes of the intensely inflationary
periods that attended American entry into both World War II and the
Korean conflict is premised on the demand-pull theory of inflation
-that a general increase in price levels is caused by an increase in
aggregate demand for goods and services.20 Thus, the inflationary pres-
sures attending outbreaks of war are the product of sharp increases in
governmental expenditures for materiel and the resulting economic
17 337 F. Supp. at 748.
18 The court in Amalgamated Meat Cutters recognized that "[t]he approaches and de-
cisions under the earlier laws are certainly not 'frozen' as guidelines for the present law ....
The fact that there are significant differences between the inflationary policies of 1970
and the inflationary problems of 1942 and 1950 provides additional reasons for differences
in policies." 337 F. Supp. at 748-49. Since it found that the APA was, under the terms of the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, applicable to the control agencies, the court concluded
that "it is hollow to say that the 1970 Act was void ab initio for failure to make provision
for these matters. We have no basis or warrant for considering--or rather speculating-in
this action whether the ongoing administration of the stabilization program may become
subject to challenge for failure to provide reasonable and meaningful opportunity for
interested persons to present objections or inequities that undercut the premise of broad
equity, or for officials to take these into account, or for courts to discharge their function of
judicial review." Id. at 762. The court thus implied the kind of functional relationship
between the content of the control program and the administrative procedures appropriate
to it that this comment explores.
19 See Radio and Television Address by President Nixon, Aug. 15, 1971, in U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws, No. 7, at 1933 (1971).
20 R. LrPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMicS 764 (2d ed. 1966).
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dislocation.2' Although these effects can be offset somewhat by fiscal
and monetary measures, it has been argued that the time necessary for
these measures to become effective cannot be afforded; inflationary pres-
sure is so intense that it must be suppressed as quickly and thoroughly
as possible, not only to avoid social and economic disruption, but also
to insure that by the manipulation of wage and price levels to shift
resources to the defense sector of the economy, mobilization will proceed
efficiently.22
In order to meet these problems, the wartime control programs at-
tempted to establish a system of planned allocation by controlling the
normal market mechanisms for allocating resources, the forces of supply
and demand.Y This was accomplished, after brief attempts to limit
controls to particularly crucial sectors, by across-the-board price freezes
followed by regulations prescribing ceiling prices for specific commodi-
ties and products.24 Price controls were based on the principle of cost-
absorption-that individual firms could not sell products at prices
above those prescribed by regulation even if a firm's cost increase had
made sales at the ceiling price unprofitable. 25 The essential concern was
21 The shifting of resources to the defense sector causes increasing scarcity of consumer
goods while, because of the full employment of manpower occasioned by war production,
the demand for consumer goods is increasing as well. Comment, Legal and Economic As-
pects of Wartime Price Control, 51 YAa LJ. 819, 820-21 (1942). The severe inflation at-
tending the outbreak of the Korean conflict probably had a strong psychological component
-demand increased dramatically because of fear of impending shortages and higher
prices, while wages and prices were raised in anticipation of the imposition of controls.
Ross, Guideline Policy-Where We Are and How We Got There, in GUIDELINEs, INFORMAL
CONTROLS, AND TnE MAR.EYLAC 97, 118-19 (G. Shultz & R. Aliber eds. 1966).
22 See DEFENSE, CONTROLS, AND INFLATION, 216-22 (A. Director ed. 1952) (remarks of
Charles Hitch); Taylor, Wage Stabilization in a Defense Economy, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 499,
500-01 (1952).
23 During World War I, the statutory authorities for the wartime controls were the
Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended, Stabilization Act, 56 Stat. 765
(1942); the Stabilization Extension Act, 58 Stat. 632 (1944); and the Price Control Exten-
sion Act, 60 Stat. 664 (1946). During the Korean conflict, they were the Defense Production
Act of 1950 tit. IV, 64 Stat. 803, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2101 et seq. (1954).
24 For a brief history of the evolution of the World War II price control policies, see
H. MANSFIELD ET AL., A SHoRT HISTORY OF OPA 89-81 (OPA Historical Reports on War
Administration, Gen. Pub. No. 15, 1947). For a description of the price control structure
established during the Korean conflict, see Letzler, The General Ceiling Price Regulation
-Problems of Coverage and Exclusion, 19 lAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 486 (1954).
25 The general principle of cost absorption was modified in two ways, by the industry-
earning standard and the product-cost standard. If either or both of these standards in-
dicated that a particular price ceiling was, for the industry as a whole, too low to insure
continued production, the price ceiling could be raised. See Gruber, Establishment and
Maintenance of Price Regulations-A Study in Administration of a Statute, 96 U. PA. L.
REv. 503-08 (1948). For a comprehensive description of OPA pricing standards, see D.
CAVErn, R. DICKERSON, et at., PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: PRICING STANDARDS (OPA His-
torical Reports on War Administration, Gen. Pub. No. 7, 1947). During the Korean period,
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thus predominantly with the general economic situation of defined
product and industry sectors rather than with the particular cost and
profit circumstances of individual firms.2 6
B. The Judicial Response to Wartime Control Procedures
The major task of the wartime control agencies was to define industry
and product sectors and employee categories and then to set price and
compensation ceilings to insure continued production and stable em-
ployment patterns. Challenges to the validity of price and rent control
regulations were allowed only on the ground that the prescribed ceilings
were too low to allow minimally profitable production for the industry
as a whole or that the product and industry sectors had been too
broadly defined.2 7 The challenges could be instituted in only one way
-by filing a protest with the control agency.28 If the protest was denied,
a complaint could be filed with the Emergency Court of Appeals, which,
during both the World War II and Korean periods, had exclusive juris-
diction to review price and rent stabilization matters. No other court
could restrain or enjoin enforcement of control regulations, and the
Emergency Court could grant injunctive relief only after a final judg-
ment; no preliminary injunctive relief was available.29
The constitutionality of the procedural framework in which the
World War II control system operated was challenged in two cases that
came before the Supreme Court in 1944. In Bowles v. Willingham,0 the
Court held that due process did not require notice and a hearing either
before the Price Administrator fixed generally applicable maximum
rents for housing in defense rental areas or before the Administrator
the industry-earning and product-cost standards were used to adjust freeze period prices;
relatively few commodity price ceilings were established. Nonetheless, cost absorption was
the basic principle of control. Nelson, OPS Price Control Standards, 19 LAw & CoNTEmP.
PROB. 554, 565-77 (1954).
20 As a general matter, wage controls during the wars were, like price ceilings, keyed
to general economic criteria varying by sector and firm. See BNA 1971 LAB. Rn.. REP.,
WAGE & SALARt CONTROLS 511-15.
27 See N. NATHANSON, PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: LEGAL PHASES pt. 1, 5-15 (OPA His-
torical Reports on War Administration, Gen. Pub. No. 11, 1947).
28 Hyman & Nathauson, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Reg-
ulations, 42 ILL. L. Rav. 584, 587 (1947). For a full description of the Korean conflict con-
trol agency procedures, see Reports on Control Agencies by the Committee on Emergency
Control Agencies, Administrative Law Section, Bar Association of the District of Colum-
bia, 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 559 (1952).
29 Hyman & Nathauson, supra note 28, at 587-88. The provisions for judicial review of
price regulations during World War II and the Korean conflict were, in most respects,
identical. Compare Emergency Price Control Act §§ 203-04, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), with De-
fense Production Act §§ 407-08, 64 Stat. 803 (1950). No statutory provision was made for
judicial review of wage regulations. See Field, Economic Stabilization under the Defense
Production Act of 1950, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1950).
80 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
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determined the appropriate housing category into which the property
of a particular landlord fell (and thus the applicable rental ceiling). In
Yakus v. United States,3' the Court held that the foreshortened, limited,
and exclusive judicial review procedures, as well as the limitations on
available relief prescribed by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,32
were consistent with the requirements of due process. 33 The Court also
denied due process challenges to the particulars of the protest procedure,
holding that the "authorized procedure is not incapable of affording
protection to petitioners' rights required by due process." 34
One commentator has suggested that these decisions may have rested
on the fact that the wartime controls were exercises of the war power
and that the requirements of due process applicable to wartime
emergency measures may well differ from those appropriate for controls
instituted under the commerce power during times of relative peace. 35
There are, indeed, indications in the opinions that the Court was con-
cerned primarily with the emergency nature of the controls and their
indispensable function as part of the war effort. A more adequate
analysis of these decisions, however, might be directed not to the formal
powers under which the controls were undertaken, but rather to the
problems that the controls were designed to meet and the substantive
nature of the programs.3 6 As the discussion above indicated, the wartime
controls were designed to counter the inflationary pressures caused by
severe disequilibria in demand and to allow mobilization to proceed as
rapidly and efficiently as possible. In order to insure that the method
31 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
32 Emergency Price Control Act §§ 203-04, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
33 Yakus was an appeal from a criminal conviction for violation of a maximum price
regulation. The principal grounds of contention, in addition to the allegation that the
Emergency Price Control Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, were
that (1) the prohibition against challenging the legality of the regulation as a defense in
the criminal trial and (2) the limits on appeals to the Emergency Court and on available
relief constituted denials of due process, 321 U.S. at 437-48; see Hyman & Nathanson,
supra note 28, at 588-93.
34 321 U.S. at 435. The petitioners in Yakus had made no attempt to avail themselves
of the protest procedure. Because of this failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
Court said: "Only if we could say in advance of resort to the statutory procedure that it
is incapable of affording due process to the petitioners could we conclude that they have
shown any legal excuse for their failure to resort to it or that their constitutional rights
have been or will be infringed." 321 U.S. at 435.
35 Kurland, Guidelines and the Constitution: Some Random Observations on Presiden-
tial Power to Control Prices and Wages, in GUIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND THE MAR-
RrrPLAcE, supra note 21, at 209, 221.
SO The Court in both Yakus and Willingham cited numerous peacetime precedents in
support of its holdings that the details of the administrative and review procedures com-
plied with due process standards. 321 U.S. at 431-48; 321 U.S. at 519-21. On this point, see
the dissent of Justice Roberts in Yakus. 321 U.S. at 459-60.
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of resource allocation established by the control system could operate,
the ceiling price regulations had to be imposed uniformly and con-
currently on all of the firms in an industry. This could be accomplished
only by administrative and judicial review procedures that were sum-
mary in nature.
In upholding these measures, the Court in the Yakus and Willingham
cases applied, in effect, what has come to be a standard principle of due
process adjudication-that the requirements of due process are at once
a function of the kinds of problems that the government must meet, the
kinds of actions that it undertakes, and the nature of the private
interests that these actions affect. The requirements depend, in short,
on a balancing of the public and private interest in procedural fairness
against the costs that certain procedures may entail.37 Thus, in Yakus, the
Court noted: "Inflation is accelerated and its consequences aggravated
by price disparities not based on geographic or other relevant differ-
entials. The harm resulting from delayed or unequal price control is
beyond repair." The Court looked to the harm that would result if
enforcement of the price ceilings "were delayed or sporadic or were
unequal or conflicting in different parts of the country" as justification
for the unitary and foreshortened review procedure and the ban on
preliminary relief.38 Similarly, in Willingham, the Court said:
Congress was dealing here with the exigencies of wartime condi-
tions and the insistent demands of inflation control . . .. It
chose a method designed to meet the needs for rent control as they
might arise and to accord some leeway for adjustment within the
formula which it prescribed. At the same time, the procedure
which Congress adopted was selected with the view of eliminating
the necessity for "lengthy and costly trials with concomitant dis-
sipation of the time and energies of all concerned in litigation
rather than in the common war effort."
The Court concluded that "to require hearings for thousands of land-
lords before any rent control order could be made effective might have
defeated the program of price control" and that where Congress has
37 See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), and the Court's elaborate ap-
pendix comparing the administrative procedures of a number of federal agencies, including
the OPS and the OPA, id. at 454-85. For a statement of the principle contemporary with
Yalus and Willingham, see NBC v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1942), in which the
court said that minimum compliance with procedural due process "will vary to a con-
siderable extent with the nature of the substantive right, the character and complexity of
the issues, the kinds of evidence and factual material, the particular body or official, and
the administrative functions involved...." Cf. Newman, The Process of Prescribing Due
Process, 49 CAiF. L. REy. 215 (1961).
38 321 U.S. at 432.
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provided for judicial review after the regulations are made effective,
"it has done all that due process under the war emergency requires."8 9
To accomplish the purposes of the wartime control programs, it may
have been necessary to employ relatively summary administrative and
judicial review procedures, and in measuring the adequacy of these
procedures, the Court looked to the emergency nature of the controls
and the manner in which they were applied.40 It would, therefore, be
a mistake to extrapolate from these decisions any notion that the present
control program either can or should operate only by means of sum-
mary procedural methods. Instead, normal principles of due process
adjudication must be used to weigh the benefits and costs of the pro-
cedures established by the present controls; and these can be determined
only by examining the purposes of the program and the manner in
which it is intended to operate.
C. Characteristics of the Present Controls
While the wartime inflation periods were characterized by extreme, if
temporary, disequilibria in demand, the present inflation period has
been characterized, at least in recent years, by fairly stable demand. A
variety of explanations has been offered as to how inflation, on the
one hand, and stable demand, relatively substantial unemployment, and
unused industrial capacity, on the other-once thought incompatible
phenomena-have somehow managed to coexist.41 One of these explana-
tions, the cost-push theory, identifies the market power of large labor
unions and oligopolistic industries as a major contributor to the problem
-the unions demand increases in wages even when there is no excess
demand for labor, and employers accede to these demands because they
are able, due to their market power, to pass the increased costs on to the
consumer.42 Another explanation regards such inflation as a psychologi-
cal phenomenon-higher wage demands and price increases are gen-
erated by the expectation that inflation in the immediate future will
continue or increase in rate as it has in the past; thus, the experience
of inflation generates inflation.43 Whatever the causes of the present
39 321 U.S. at 520-21; cf. Schwartz, Procedural Due Process in Federal Administrative
Law, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 552, 563-66 (1950).
40 The Emergency Court employed principles similar to those in Yakus and Willingham
to deny due process challenges to the administrative and review provisions of the World
War II controls. See, e.g., Avant v. Bowles, 139 F.2d 702, 706 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943); Taylor
v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654, 660-63 (Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943).
41 Solow, The Case Against the Case Against the Guideposts, in GUIDELIN S, INFORMAL
CONTROLS, AND THE MARXETPLA E, supra note 21, at 41-42.
42 See Ackley, The Contribution of Guidelines, in GuIDELINES, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND
THE MARKTLAcE, supra note 21, at 67, 68-72; Ross, supra note 21, at 101-02.
43 For an explanation of how price expectations can affect demand, see R. IP sEY & P.
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inflation,44 the intent of the present control program is not to place
limits on demand, but rather to reduce the rate of inflation by limiting
the effects of factors other than supply and demand-whether these are
identified as market power or expectation or both-on individual wage
and price decisions that help generate inflation.
Consistent with this analysis, the present controls, unlike the wartime
controls, are not directed to defining maximum wage and price levels
by product and industry sectors. They are concerned instead with plac-
ing some limits on the discretion of individual firms to raise the wages
that they pay their employees and the prices at which they sell their
products-limits in addition to, rather than in place of, those imposed
by the market. The price control regulations promulgated by the Price
Commission, for example, are generally premised, not on the cost-
absorption principle of the wartime controls, but rather on flow-through
of costs. Firms are allowed to increase prices over freeze period levels
by amounts corresponding to increases in allowable costs (i.e., all costs,
direct or indirect, except those specifically disallowed by the Commis-
sion 45), but only if such increases will result in pretax profit margins,
calculated as a percentage of sales, no greater than those that prevailed
during a defined base period.48 Thus, application of the price control
regulations necessarily varies from firm to firm because any allowable
STEINER, supra note 20, at 554. Households may be willing to pay a premium for goods
purchased now so long as it is less than the anticipated price increase; by the same token,
unions, in negotiating long-term contracts may take into account the expected rate of in.
flation during the course of the contract, in order to calculate contract demands that will
result in a real wage increase. These effects may help to produce a "market rate of infla-
tion." There are indications that the Administration accepts the notion of inflation as a
psychological phenomenon as a working premise for the Phase II controls. See White
House Background Paper, supra note 1, at 2226. The House Report on the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 spoke of the many witnesses before the Committee who had
"called on the Congress to provide discretionary standby authority to the President to im-
pose ... controls to combat and break the back of inflation and the inflationary psychology
which pervades our thinking and our economy." H.R. REP. No. 91-1330, supra note 13, at
9.
44 Fiscal and monetary policies might, if severe enough, eventually be able to reduce
the present inflation rate significantly, but not without causing debilitating and politically
inexpedient subsidiary effects, such as increased unemployment and further slackening in
economic growth. See Solow, supra note 41, at 42-44. Controls are therefore invoked in
order to slow the wage-price spiral, and, at the same time, fiscal and monetary policies are
used to further employment and growth by increasing aggregate demand.
45 Price Commission Regulations, 6 C.FR. § 300.5 (1972).
46 This rule applies to manufacturers. Id. § 300.12. Similarly, retail and wholesale firms
must calculate prices on the basis of their customary initial percentage mark-ups, which
may be no higher than those that the firm employed during the base period; again, a firm
may not increase its prices beyond an amount that would bring its net profit, calculated
as a percentage of sales, to a level greater than that of the base period. Id. § 300.13. For
the rules as to service firms, see id. § 300.14.
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price increase depends on the peculiar cost and profit circumstances of
the individual firm. The same features pervade the wage control regu-
lations promulgated by the Pay Board.47
D. The Procedural Consequences of the Substantive Controls
There are three central differences between the control programs
instituted during World War II and the Korean conflict and the pro-
gram now operating. First, the wartime controls were temporary,
emergency measures, to be lifted when the emergency ended; the
present controls, because they are a response to an economic emergency
caused by problems endemic in the economic structure, are open-ended
in duration and may, in some form, be permanent or at least recurrent.
Second, the wartime controls were intended to be relatively rigid and
were designed to further the war effort as much as to spare the nation
the vicissitudes of inflation. The present controls are designed to pre-
serve a degree of fluidity in the wage and price structure within indi-
vidualized limits. Thus, the wartime controls established specific wage
and price ceilings applicable universally to industrial and product
sectors. The present controls, in contrast, are keyed directly to the
operations and circumstances of individual firms. However detailed
the control regulations are made, their precise application will remain,
to some degree, a matter of judgment and interpretation-functions
that the procedural structure of the controls must be designed to pro-
vide.
Perhaps the most important distinction between the wartime and
present controls, however, concerns the degree to which they were in-
tended to interfere with the normal resource allocation function of the
market economy. The central tenet of price theory is that changes in
price in a free economy directly reflect the workings of the market mech-
anism-the dynamic changes in the relative levels of supply and demand
that, in turn, are the result of millions of independent decisions by pro-
ducers and consumers. This market mechanism, operating in the context
of a competitive enterprise system, theoretically allocates resources with
maximum efficiency. 48 The wartime control agencies, because of the
severe disequilibria in demand caused by the war effort, were compelled
47 The wage control regulations allow a maximum aggregate wage and salary increase
of 5.5 percent annually over the rate paid at the end of the freeze period or before the
effective date of a new wage agreement. The standard does not apply to each individual
employee but to the average increase in an "appropriate employee unit," defined as all em-
ployees in a bargaining unit or in a recognized employee category. The wage controls, like
the price controls, are thus keyed to circumstances-pay practices and employee classifica-
tion systems-that vary widely from firm to firm. Pay Board Regulations, 6 C.F.R. §§
201.10-.16 (1972).
48 See G. SrLorER, TBE TEoRY oF PRucE 14-16 (Sd ed. 1966).
[39:566
Economic Controls
to control supply and demand, and thus to manipulate the allocation of
resources, by imposing absolute categorical ceilings on wage and price
levels. The present control program, in contrast, has no resource alloca-
tion function at all; it is intended to reduce the influence only of those
forces other than supply and demand that affect individual wage and
price decisions and thus contribute to the rate of inflation.
These considerations bear directly on the appropriateness of various
procedural safeguards in the context of the present control program.
In measuring the adequacy of the procedural mechanisms by which the
World War II control system operated, the Supreme Court in the
Yakus and Willingham cases took into account the necessity of relatively
summary procedures if the control program was to be effective and "the
dangers to price control as a preventive of inflation if the validity and
effectiveness of prescribed maximum prices were to be subjected to the
exigencies and delays of litigation .... -49
Under the present system, however, such summary procedures would
not only be unnecessary; they would be dysfunctional to the purposes
of the controls as well. In the 1971 amendments, Congress recognized
the necessity that the control program interfere as little as possible with
the market mechanism; it required the control agencies to make "such
general exceptions and variations as are necessary to foster orderly
economic growth and to prevent gross inequities, hardships, serious
market disruptions, domestic shortages of raw materials, localized short-
ages of labor, and windfall profits." 50 This requirement of exceptions
is essential if the control program is to meet the pressures placed on its
constraints by the operation of market forces. The individualized ceil-
ings imposed by the control regulations inevitably limit the degree to
which firms are able to respond to changes in supply and demand and
may, therefore, come to interfere with the fundamental workings of
the market. In short, market forces are likely, in the long run and in
some sectors, to press sharply against the constraints of the controls
unless exceptions, wherever appropriate, are made.
In addition, because the precise restrictions of the controls vary with
the price, profit, and wage structure of each firm, there will undoubtedly
be disputes as to the correct application of the regulations to individual
circumstances. It is essential, therefore, that parties affected by the
controls have some means to present their situations to control authori-
ties so that they can, if nothing else, find out precisely what the controls
allow or forbid them to do. For the control agencies to perform these
49 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 432 (1944).
GO 1971 Amendments § 203(b)(2).
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two basically adjudicative functions51-to make informed decisions
as to the necessity and extent of exceptions and the correct application
of the control regulations to particular facts-the parties subject to
the controls must be allowed to present fully to the control authorities
the facts and arguments relevant to their case.
The procedures appropriate to such determinations involve costs,
particularly because of the potentially enormous number of grievances
and challenges with which control authorities may have to deal. But
these costs are greatly exceeded by the benefits of adequate administra-
tive and judicial review machinery. First, unless appropriate procedures
are devised to deal with petitions for exceptions, it is at least less likely
that exceptions will be granted, however necessary or desirable they
may be to avoid market disallocation. Second, unless adequate adminis-
trative precedures are available, firms not subject to the prior approval
and periodic reporting requirements 2 may prefer to respond in their
normal fashion to the pressures of the market rather than to undertake
voluntarily the rigors of compliance.53 There is, in fact, some evidence
that this phenomenon is already occurring5 4 Administrative procedures
are likely to be significantly less costly than primary reliance on policing
efforts and enforcement by the courts through criminal penalties or in-
junctive relief. Enforcement of the controls will be more difficult than
it was in the World War II and Korean conflict periods because, unlike
the dear, objective standards of the sector price ceilings, the precise
limitations on wage and price increases depend on a multiplicity of
51 For a description of the functions of adjudicative proceedings and a collection of
cases concerning the procedures appropriate to them, see K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
T.XT ch. 8 (3d ed. 1972).
52 Under the Phase II regulations, all business units are divided into three groups. The
divisions as to prices are based on annual volume of sales-firms with annual sales of $100
million or more are required to notify and obtain the prior approval of the Price Com-
mission before raising prices on any product; firms with annual sales of $50 million or
more are required to report periodically to the Commission any changes in prices, costs,
and profits; other firms, while not required to obtain prior approval or to report on a
regular basis, are nonetheless subject to the price regulations. The wage controls operate
through a similar three-tiered classification system based on the number of employees
whom proposed pay increases will affect. Cost of Living Council Regulations, 6 C.F.R.
§§ 101.11-.15, 10121-.25 (1972).
53 Cf. Friedman, What Price Guideposts?, in GumIELINEs, INFORMAL CONTROLS, AND THE
MARKETPLACE, supra note 21, at 17, 37-98.
54 See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1972, at 16, col. 1 (Midwest ed.):
Lumber and plywood prices are bumping against their authorized ceilings and have
even broken through in some cases, as a result of what lumbermen call an "unusually
strong" market for this time of year. Despite the price lids .... lumbermen say con-
tinued buying pressure is bound to force prices higher .... Compounding the prob-
lem is confusion over which price boosts are permissible, and which aren't .... Some
market sources say continued confusion over ceiling policies can only add to what is
already considerable upward pressure on demand.
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factors peculiar to each firm.5 5 In addition, adequate preenforcement
procedures may result in more widespread compliance with control
standards. Even with far more enforcement personnel than the Adminis-
tration has thus far provided, 56 inspections and, thus, court actions
against violators would be largely hit-or-miss, and firms might calculate
-particularly when pressed by the supply and demand forces of the
market-that the benefits of noncompliance would outweigh the like-
lihood and consequences of apprehension.
An adequate procedural system will also perform another function
crucial to the success of the controls. Administrative and judicial review
procedures can provide the agencies with a continuous flow of informa-
tion about the operation of the regulations in specific factual contexts
and thus serve as a valuable adjunct to the rule-making process. Taken
together, these benefits of procedures appropriate to the kinds of deter-
minations that the control agencies must make not only exceed the
costs that they may entail; they also provide the means by which, and
perhaps by which alone, the purposes of the controls can be achieved.
II. PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE OF THE CONTROLS
The considerations outlined above indicate that if the present scheme
of economic control is to work effectively, it must operate by means of
procedural mechanisms that maximize participation by affected parties
in order to insure that the restrictions imposed by the control regula-
tions will be adjusted to the exigencies of individual circumstances.
The following sections of this comment measure the extent to which the
administrative and judicial review provisions of the 1971 amendments
and the procedural regulations promulgated by the control agencies
succeed in meeting this need.
A. Administrative Procedures
Having concluded that the requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 57 would result in "too cumbersome and dilatory a pro-
cedure,"' i8 Congress exempted, in the 1971 amendments, the control
5 Because of this, section 210 of the 1971 amendments, which allows private damage
actions for prices charged in excess of those allowed under the control regulations, ap-
pears to be a rather ineffective appendage. Such private actions were allowed under the
World War II and Korean conflict stabilization statutes, but violations of the wartime
price ceilings were relatively easy to detect. Detection of violations of the current regula-
tions, in contrast, requires detailed knowledge of a firm's past and present costs, profits,
and customary mark-ups and is, therefore, almost impossible for private individuals-the
consumers. Thus, government inspection and enforcement is more important.
56 See Wall Street Journal, Mar. 14, 1972, at 16, col. 1 (Midwest ed.).
57 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
58 S. REP. No. 92-07, supra note 5, at 8.
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agencies from most of the Act's provisions.5 9 It rejected, however, the
Administration's proposal60 that the agencies, like those of the Korean
period 6 1 be exempted from all of the Act's requirements.62
1. Rule Making. The 1971 amendments subject the control agencies
to the section of the APA that governs the rule-making process, the
procedures by which generally applicable regulations are formulated . 3
The section, when it applies, requires that notice of proposed rule
making be published in the Federal Register; interested parties are
then given "an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without op-
portunity for oral presentation." 64 The control agencies have to date,
however, almost universally taken advantage of the provision in the
section that allows agencies to disregard the prescribed rule-making
procedure "when the agency for good cause finds . .. that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest."65 The general regulations promulgated at the
outset of the Phase II controls were designed to govern nearly all sectors
of the economy. Because of the extremely broad scope of these initial
regulations and the time pressures under which they were formulated,66
the APA's rule-making procedures would have been of little utility.
But in recent months, the rule-making activities of the control agencies
have become more particularized; their attention has been directed
increasingly to the formulation and modification of rules to meet prob-
lems of more localized significance pertaining only to certain kinds
and categories of firms.67 Under these circumstances, the rule-making
procedure of the APA could serve as an instrument to secure the views
59 1971 Amendments § 207(a).
60 S. 2712, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 207 (1971). The Administration's proposal would, how-
ever, have subjected the agencies to the Freedom of Information Act, a part of the APA.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
61 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. Apr. § 2159 (1951). The Administrative
Procedure Act was originally enacted in 1946 (60 Stat. 237) and did not apply to the
World War II control agencies.
62 For the provisions of the APA to which the control agencies remain subject under
the 1971 amendments, see text and notes at notes 63, 70, 87 infra.
63 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
64 Id. § 553(c). In most cases, substantive rules must be published at least thirty days
before they are to take effect. Id. § 553(d).
65 Id. § 553(b)(B).
66 The Phase II control agencies were established on October 15, and the initial, gen-
erally applicable regulations went into effect on November 13. See note 1 supra. These
general regulations are those described in the text and notes at notes 45-47 supra.
67 See, for example, the Price Commission regulations governing institutional providers




and information available to those most immediately concerned and
acquainted with the problems.
Since imposition of the initial, generally applicable wage and price
regulations, the present control agencies have not been operating under
time pressure comparable to that to which the wartime control agencies
were subject. The wartime agencies were required to impose and adjust
maximum price levels as quickly as possible in response to changes in
supply and war needs in order to avoid misallocation of resources.68
The new regulations that the present agencies are now formulating
involve adjustments in the methods of calculating permissible wage and
price increases contained in the general regulations, tailoring them to
the peculiar circumstances of certain kinds of firms. While the new
regulations are being formulated, these firms will remain subject to the
general regulations. Since the present controls are intended not to pre-
vent any particular wage or price increase, but only to keep the rate of
inflation for the economy as a whole within tolerable limits, the delay
entailed in the APA's rule-making procedure would not impede the
general effectiveness of the control program.
2. Adjudicative Proceedings. The administrative procedure section
of the 1971 amendments requires the control agencies to "establish
appropriate procedures, including hearings where deemed advisable,"
to consider requests for interpretations and modifications of, and excep-
tions to, control regulations, rules, and orders. 69 The amendments
exempt the agencies from all APA provisions relating to adjudicative
proceedings, except for the requirement that prompt notice be given
"of the denial in whole or in part of a written application, petition, or
other request of an interested person made in connection with any
agency proceeding," together with a brief statement of the grounds for
the denial.70 This requirement fills the need, often recognized by courts,
for informing petitioners of the reasons and findings on which adminis-
trative decisions have been based; they provide interested parties with a
basis for judging whether a challenge to the decision is appropriate and,
at the same time, facilitate administrative and judicial review.71
Under the provisions of the control agencies' procedural regulations,
the possible requests for administrative determinations are divided into
several categories: interpretations and rulings, exceptions, exemptions,
reclassifications, and pay challenges.72 The procedures applicable to each
68 See text at notes 36-37 supra.
69 1971 Amendments § 207(b).
70 5 US.C. § 555(e) (1970).
71 See cases cited in K.C. DAvis, A,1NisrRxnvE LAw TEXT ch. 16 (3d ed. 1972).
72 Interpretations of the regulations as they apply to specific factual contexts are issued
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of these categories are in most respects similar. There are, however, some
important differences, particularly as to the kinds of parties given stand-
ing to request an administrative decision.
The regulations allow any person to request an interpretation or
ruling as to the application of the control regulations to particular cir-
cumstances.7 3 The procedural structure that has been established to
deal with these requests advances in stages from the use of relatively
informal devices (written applications and conferences) at the initial
stages to more formal modes of procedure (including hearings) em-
ployed only when applicants feel sufficiently aggrieved by decisions made
at earlier stages in the process to prosecute appeals to the agencies. Even
then, a hearing is allowed only if the agency considers it necessary to
adduce evidence in a case.74 An objection might be posed to this system
that a hearing should be available at an earlier stage in the process in
order to allow an applicant fully to present his case. In fact, however,
most of the evidence and arguments relevant to the application of
control regulations involve economic information and data that can
be adequately presented in written form. In addition, interpretations
and rulings will be made on the basis of information submitted by the
applicant alone rather than information and arguments submitted by
two or more opposing sides that could be clarified through oral presenta-
to applicants by the district offices of the Internal Revenue Service "only where a deter-
mination can be made on the basis of established rules as set forth in the regulations and
guidelines of the Cost of Living Council, Pay Board, and Price Commission, or by rulings
or court decisions." 6 C.F.R. § 401.2 (1972). Rulings are written statements interpreting and
applying regulations and guidelines; they are issued by the Office of the Chief Counsel of
the IRS. Id. § 401.2. The IRS has announced that in some circumstances, interpretations
and rulings will not be available. Id. § 401.205 (1972). An exception is defined in the IRS
regulations as "a waiver in a particular case of the requirements of any rule, regulation,
or order," id. § 401.2; decisions as to exceptions are made by the appropriate control
agency, id. § 401.304. An exemption is a general waiver from all control requirements.
Id. § 401.2. Reclassification from one price or pay category to another (see note 52 supra)
can be made only by the Cost of Living Council. Id. §§ 101.19, 101.29. Pay challenges are
objections to any changes in wages or salaries made after November 13, 1971 in accordance
with existing contracts or pay practices. Id. §§ 205.2, 201.14.
73 Id. § 401.202.
74 A request for an interpretation or ruling can be initiated by submitting an applica-
tion in writing to the district office of the IRS; the applicant may request an interview to
discuss the application. Any person aggrieved by an adverse ruling or determination may
file with the district director of the IRS an appeal, which will be decided by a district
conferee after a conference with the appellant. If this appeal is denied, a further appeal
may be filed with the appropriate control agency. If the appeal presents a prima fade
case that the IRS determination was erroneous, the agency will determine whether addi-
tional evidence or a hearing is necessary before it makes its final decision. Id. § 401.101,




tions.7 5 Under these circumstances, the informal devices can be expected
to dispose of the great majority of applications efficiently and fairly.
Hearings can then be used as a corrective mechanism to determine
whether decisions reached by means of less expensive and time-consum-
ing procedures correctly applied the regulations to the facts.76 The
procedures thus allow adequate participation by applicants to insure
that proper interpretations and rulings will be achieved.
Requests for exemption from the controls or exceptions in the
application of particular regulations may be initiated in the same man-
ner as requests for interpretations, except that the applicant must pre-
sent evidence sufficient to establish that "the application of economic
stabilization regulations and guidelines will result in serious hardship or
gross inequity."77 Upon receiving the request, the control agency will
decide whether an exception is appropriate; it will, however, reconsider
its original decision if any person makes a prima facie showing that the
decision was erroneous in fact or law. If a prima facie case has been
made, the agency may direct that a hearing be held. The same procedure
is used by the Cost of Living Council in considering reclassification
requests38 It is important to note that any party or group, not only the
original applicant, that considers itself adversely affected by the grant or
denial of an exception may resort to the reconsideration procedure.7 9
Contrary to the practice of the other agencies, the Pay Board regulations
provide that the Board may, upon receipt of an application for an
exception, invite the applicant and other interested parties to partici-
pate in formal or informal hearings before the initial decision on the
application is made.80 This corresponds to the special procedure that
the Board has devised to deal with pay challenges-upon receipt of
the challenge, the Board notifies all interested parties that a challenge
has been filed, and the parties may then request permission to participate
in the proceedings. 8'
75 See id. § 401.101.
76 For a description and evaluation of the closely analogous procedures that the IRS
has employed in tax complaint cases since 1952, see P. WOLL, ADmINSrATImV LAw, THE
INFORMAL PROCaSS 104-16 (1968).
77 6 C.F.R. § 401.303(b)(1) (1972).
78 Id. §§ 401.301-04 (IRS), 105.80-.38 (Cost of Living Council), 205.30-.40 (Pay Board),
305.30-.88 (Price Commission).
79 See id. §§ 105.33 (Cost of Living Council), 805.38 (Price Commission). Under the Pay
Board regulations, only a "person aggrieved" (defined as "a person with a substantial
pecuniary interest in a pay adjustment which is the subject of an adverse action," id.
§ 205.2) or another party to the initial proceedings may request reconsideration. Id.
§ 205.34.
80 Id. § 205.31(a).
81 The Pay Board will determine whether the parties requesting participation either
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In the processing of pay challenges, as well as of requests for exemp-
tions and exceptions, hearings may be a necessary fact-finding device far
more frequently than in the processing of requests for interpretations
and rulings. It is essential to the success of the control program that ex-
ceptions be granted wherever necessary to effect the program's economic
policies. The control agency's determination must, therefore, take into
account all relevant factors in the applicant's circumstances. Conse-
quently, it may be neither possible nor wise to measure the necessity of
an exception or the validity of a pay challenge solely on the basis of in-
formation and arguments submitted by the applicant. This is particu-
larly true in the case of Pay Board decisions because the interests of
employees and employers may not often coincide and the proceedings
can be, appropriately, adversary in nature.
It is difficult to ascertain solely from the regulations how frequently
the control agencies contemplate that hearings will be necessary
and, in particular, how liberal the Pay Board will be in authorizing
participation in exception and pay challenge proceedings. The pro-
cedures outlined above can be effective administrative mechanisms for
dealing with exception requests and pay challenges only if the agencies
insure that all affected parties have a full opportunity to present the data
and arguments that support their positions. The agencies should, there-
fore, allow hearings wherever a prima facie case has been made for
an exception or pay challenge and should allow broad participation by
all affected parties.
The 1971 amendments and the control agencies' procedural regula-
tions seem to have established, on the whole, procedures appropriate
to the functions and purposes of the control program. It is difficult to
understand, however, why either the Administration or Congress
thought it necessary to exempt the control agencies from the provisions
of the APA governing adjudicative proceedings.8 2 Since the provisions
apply only to those cases "required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for agency hearing,"s3 the agencies would
have retained the same discretion in providing hearings that they do
under the present amendments and regulations. The regulations, in fact,
differ in few particulars from the APA requirements; they thus conform,
are subject to or will be adversely affected by the challenged pay adjustment and whether
their participation would contribute "to an equitable decision." All parties granted leave
to participate are allowed to present evidence and argument in writing in support of their
positions. Id. § 205.32. For the definition of pay challenge, see note 72 supra.
82 5 US.C. §§ 554-57 (1970).
83 Id. § 554(a).
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in the main, to the norms of administrative procedure that the APA has
come to represent.8 4
B. Judicial Review
The 1971 amendments concerning judicial review of stabilization
regulations and decisions 5 are intended to achieve three primary ends:
"(1) speed and consistency of decisions in cases arising under the Act,
(2) avoidance of any breaks or stays in the operation of the Stabilization
Program, and (3) relief for particular persons aggrieved by the operation
of the program.""6 The amendments give the federal district courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases arising under the Act and
under regulations and orders issued by the control agencies, regardless
of the amount in controversy. To insure consistency of decision, the
amendments create a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals to hear
all appeals from district court decisions in economic control cases. In
general, the Emergency Court has the same jurisdictional powers as the
circuit courts of appeals.
The amendments provide that no regulation issued by a control
agency may be enjoined or set aside unless a final judgment of the
Emergency Court or the Supreme Court determines that the regulation
is beyond the agency's statutory authority or arbitrary and capricious.
Similarly, no order or adjudication may be enjoined or set aside except
when a final judgment of the Emergency Court or the Supreme Court
determines that the order is beyond the agency's statutory authority,
unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise unlawful under the
judicial review criteria set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.8 7
The district courts have no power to enjoin, either temporarily or
permanently, the operation of any part of the control program, and the
Emergency Court may issue injunctions only upon final judgment. The
district courts may, however, declare a regulation or order invalid under
the criteria for judicial review of agency actions described above, and
any party may then, within thirty days, file a motion in the Emergency
Court requesting permanent injunctive relief. There is, however, one
important exception to the amendments' limitations on the availability
of injunctive relief: "In order to provide relief for a particular person
who may be aggrieved by the operation of this program during the
period in which he is attempting to establish his legal position," both
84 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
85 1971 Amendments § 211.
86 S. REP. No. 92-507, supra note 5, at 10.
87 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
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the district courts and the Emergency Court are empowered to enjoin,
either temporarily or permanently, the application of a particular
order or regulation to a party in litigation before them.88
These provisions, taken together, appear to provide an efficient and
thorough structure for judicial review of control agency actions. It
may be questioned, however, whether the elaborate restrictions on the
powers of the courts to grant preliminary injunctive relief are of any
real utility. In their absence, the courts would be governed by normal
equity principles-plaintiffs would have to demonstrate the probability
of irreparable injury, and this probability would be balanced against
possible danger to the control system and the nation's economy were
injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, granted. 9 But the
statutory provision allowing individual litigants injunctive relief from
the application of particular regulations and orders is a significant im-
provement over the President's proposals, which would have forbidden
temporary injunctions altogether. 0 The present control program is
not intended to prevent all general price fluctuations above certain
maximum levels, as were the wartime controls. Temporary price or
wage increases by a particular firm, authorized by temporary injunctive
relief, will not, therefore, endanger in any significant way the general
effectiveness of the controls and may be able to prevent irreparable eco-
nomic damage to individual parties.
SUMMARY
It has been the stated goal of the Administration from the outset of
the Phase II economic control program to avoid the creation of a mas-
sive bureaucratic apparatus like those that administered the stabilization
programs of World War II and the Korean conflict.91 But a control
program inadequately staffed may be far more injurious to the eco-
nomic health of the nation than no control program at all. The stabili-
zation measures instituted by the Phase II control agencies attempt to
regulate the general performance of the economy by placing elaborate
88 1971 Amendments § 211(d)(2); S. REP. No. 92-507, supra note 5, at 11-12. If the dis-
trict court determines that an action commenced before it concerning economic controls
raises a substantial constitutional issue, it is required to certify the issue to the Emergency
Court, which may either have the entire case sent to it for deision or remand with bind-
ing instructions. Id. § 211(c).
89 This point is discussed in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440-42 (1944).
90 S. 2712, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208(f)-(g) (1971). On this point, the Administration
bill hewed closely to the judicial review provisions of the wartime stabilization statutes.
See text and note at note 29 supra.
91 See White House Background Paper, supra note 1, at 2226. See also S. Rlp. No. 92-




constraints on the details of daily economic transactions; they inevitably
interfere with the market forces that normally govern the rise and fall
of wage and price levels. This comment has attempted to demonstrate
the necessity of adequate administrative and judicial review machinery
and broad participation in agency decision-making processes in order
to minimize this interference. The procedural regulations issued by
the agencies and the judicial review structure created by Congress seem,
on their face, adequate to meet this need. Of course, if the agencies
should, in the future, abandon the present control scheme and adopt,
in its stead, the kind of sector control employed by the wartime pro-
grams, different and perhaps more summary procedures might be ap-
propriate. If the present control program should fail, it will not be be-
cause of some inherent incompatibility between comprehensive eco-
nomic controls, on the one hand, and normal standards of procedural
fairness, on the other; rather, it will be because the personnel necessary
to give the procedural structure flesh are lacking or, more likely, be-
cause the substantive policies of the stabilization program are mistaken.
Ronald G. Carr
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